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Abstract
Extreme-scale scientific applications can be more vulnerable
to soft errors (transient faults) as high-performance com-
puting systems increase in scale. The common practice to
evaluate the resilience to faults of an application is random
fault injection, a method that can be highly time consuming.
While resilience prediction modeling has been recently pro-
posed to predict application resilience in a faster way than
fault injection, it can only predict a single class of fault man-
ifestation (SDC) and there is no evidence demonstrating that
it can work on previously unseen programs, which greatly
limits its re-usability.
We present PARIS, a resilience prediction method that
addresses the problems of existing prediction methods us-
ing machine learning. Using carefully-selected features and
a machine learning model, our method is able to make re-
silience predictions of three classes of fault manifestations
(success, SDC, and interruption) as opposed to one class like
in current resilience prediction modeling. The generality of
our approach allows us to make prediction on new applica-
tions, i.e., previously unseen applications, providing large
applicability to our model. Our evaluation on 125 programs
shows that PARIS provides high prediction accuracy, 82%
and 77% on average for predicting the rate of success and in-
terruption, respectively, while the state-of-the-art resilience
prediction model cannot predict them. When predicting the
rate of SDC, PARIS provides much better accuracy than the
state-of-the-art (38% vs. -273%). PARIS is much faster (up
to 450x speedup) than the traditional method (random fault
injection).
1 Introduction
High-performance computing (HPC) systems are increas-
ingly used to run large scientific applications that simulate
real-world phenomena. These applications are expected to
compute precise and correct numerical answers for a large
set of science and engineering problems. As HPC systems
increase in scale, they become more susceptible to soft er-
rors [5] (also known as transient faults) due to feature size
shrinking, lower voltages, and increasing densities in hard-
ware infrastructures [53]. As a result, scientific applications
running at extreme scale must apply different resilience
methods to tolerate frequent soft errors. Applying these
methods to a given application often requires a deep under-
standing of the degree of resilience of the application.
The common practice to study application resilience to
errors in HPC system is Fault Injection (FI) [10, 16, 25, 30, 34,
38, 57, 59, 60]. This approach uses a large amount of random
FIs, each of which randomly selects an instruction, and then
triggers bit flips at the instruction input or output operands
during application execution. Statistical results are then used
to quantify application resilience. A typical analysis is, for
example, to measure the percentage of times a fault yields
silent data corruption (SDC) in the output of the program.
While FI works in practice and is widely used in resilience
studies, a key problem of this approach is that it is highly
time consuming, and as a result it is usually applied to limited
scenarios, for example, on applications that run for a short
period of time and/or single-threaded codes. To illustrate the
problem, consider an application that runs for 6 hours—a
typical execution time for a large-scale scientific simulation.
Using statistical analysis (e.g., using [37]), the number of ran-
dom FIs to obtain a low margin of error (e.g., 1%-3%) is in the
order of thousands of injections. Thus, the total FI campaign
could last several days. For multi-threaded or multi-process
applications, this time is much higher since random faults
must be injected in different threads or processes.
Since FI is too time consuming to measure application
resilience, recent work proposed the idea of predicting ap-
plication resilience using an error-propagation model, as
opposed to measuring application resilience via FI. The idea
is to build a model that explains how errors in instructions
propagate to the program output and then use the model
to estimate the percentage of times SDC occurs. Here, re-
silience prediction avoids running the code multiple times
(as in traditional FI) at the price of being sometimes less
accurate than FI. The most recent work on this domain is
Trident [40], which uses an analytical model to predict the
rate of SDC for a given application and input.
While the Trident approach is a useful first step in the
direction of application resilience prediction, it has some
limitations. First, the approach predicts only a specific class
of fault manifestation, SDC. Usually when analyzing the
resilience of an application, scientists are interested in un-
derstanding at least three classes of fault manifestations: (1)
SDC, (2) interruptions (i.e., crashes or hangs), and (3) success
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(i.e., the fault was benign and did not affect the program out-
put). Because of the low-level analytical modeling approach
of Trident, it cannot predict all of these three cases. Second,
resilience predictions are made on the program that was
used to build the model and there is no evidence demonstrat-
ing that it can work on previously unseen programs, which
greatly limits the re-usability of the model.
Paper Contributions. We present PARIS, an approach
for fast and accurate prediction of application resilience.
PARIS avoids the time-consuming process of randomly se-
lecting and executing many injections that FI incurs. Using
machine learning and a large set of representative programs
and kernels as the input, we build a generic model that ex-
plains how errormasking and error propagation occurwithin
code regions. Once the model is trained, it can be used to
predict three classes of fault manifestations—SDC, interrup-
tions and success—for a new, previously unseen application,
addressing the major limitations of Trident.
Our machine learning modeling is unique and is based
on several key principles. First, we aim at building a model
that captures the implicit relationship between application
characteristics and application resilience, which is difficult
to capture for analytical models, such as [40]. Second, we
carefully choose application characteristics as features for
the model; we select features that are directly related to ap-
plication resilience and that capture the order of execution
of instructions as we found that the latter is critical in accu-
rately modeling error propagation. Third, we perform sophis-
ticated feature reduction to enable efficient model training.
Fourth, we perform a large model-selection search among 18
different widely-used models—while regression is the most
natural choice of modeling for our problem, there are a num-
ber of regression models, thus we must answer which model
can provide the best accuracy.
In summary, our contributions are as follows.
• We present PARIS, the first machine learning-based ap-
proach to predict application resilience; we find that our
approach is up to 450x faster than the traditional FI ap-
proach.
• We describe a framework to build machine leaning models
that can predict more classes of fault manifestations than
the state-of-the-art resilience prediction method, Trident
[40]: three in our case (SDC, interruptions, and success)
versus one (SDC) on Trident. Our prediction accuracy
for SDC is better than Trident (38% vs. -273% on average).
Our prediction accuracy for success and interruptions pre-
diction is 82% and 77%, with a variation of 0.02 and 0.05,
respectively, while Trident cannot predict those cases.
• We design and demonstrate that our modeling method
can predict application resilience on previously unseen
applications, i.e., applications that were not used on the
modeling phase, which current methods cannot do.
Our evaluation methodology is solid and comprehensive.
We use in total of 125 programs, 18 machine learning models
and perform 375,000 FIs to compare our results to those of
traditional random FI, using a confidence interval of 99% and
a margin error of 1%. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first on providing such a compressive evaluation for a
resilience prediction method.
2 Background
We present useful background information and definitions
before presenting our approach.
2.1 Fault Model
We consider soft errors [5], i.e., transient faults that escape
from hardware protection and propagate to the application
level. These errors manifest as bit flips in registers and mem-
ory locations. Corrupted registers and memory cells are con-
sumed by the application. We refer to any of these registers
and memory locations as a location in the paper.
We focus on single-bit errors, not multi-bit errors. The
reason behind this is that (1) single-bit errors are the most
common soft errors—multi-bit errors rarely happen in large-
scale systems [6]; (2) in many cases, multi-bit errors have the
similar impact on the application as single-bit errors [50].
Fault injection. We use PINFI [59] to perform fault in-
jections into programs. Comparing with LLFI [55] and RE-
FINE [25] (two common FI tools), PINFI [59] is more accurate
than LLFI and comparable to REFINE for FI.
2.2 Application Resilience
We run FI campaigns to measure the application resilience. A
FI campaign contains many FIs. In each FI, a single-bit error
is injected into an input/output operand of an instruction. A
location can be an operand of any instruction.
We classify the outcome, or manifestation, of programs
corrupted by bit flips into three classes: success, SDC, and
interruption:
• Success: the execution outcome is exactly the same as the
outcome of the fault-free run. The execution outcome can
also be different from the outcome of the fault-free run, but
the execution successfully passes the result verification
phase of the application.
• SDC: the program outcome is different from the outcome
of the fault-free execution, and the execution does not pass
the result verification phase of the application.
• Interruption: the execution does not reach the end of ex-
ecution, i.e., it is interrupted in the middle of the execution,
because of an exception, crash, or hang.
Rates. To quantify the application resilience in a given FI
campaign, we measure the rate of each of the three classes
of manifestations described above. In particular, we use the
formula:
#Manifestations/N , (1)
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Figure 1. Overview of PARIS and the workflow of the training process in our machine learning model.
where #Manifestations is the number of times a given class
of manifestation (success, SDC or interruption) occurs, and
N is the number of FIs performed in a FI campaign. In this
paper, we consider the rates of success, SDC and interruption
as metrics to quantify application resilience.
2.3 Features and Machine Learning Models
Features. A feature is an application characteristic. Multiple
features construct a feature vector, v , which is used as the
input for our machine learning models. Choosing discrimi-
native features is an essential task for building an effective
machine learning model. However, irrelevant and redundant
features can affect the modeling accuracy, thus we must
perform feature selection on the modeling process.
Models. There are two classes of machine learning mod-
els: classification and regression. Our problem is naturally
a regression problem since the manifestation rates are real
numbers. More formally, our problem is to find a model f (),
for which given an feature vector v corresponding to an ap-
plication A, f (v) gives us the rates of SDC, interruption, and
success for A. Note that the SDC, interruption, and success
rates are real numbers between 0.0 and 1.0. Since they are
mutually exclusive events, the addition of them for a given
application is 1.0.
Prediction Accuracy. After our model is trained, it is
used to predict application resilience. To estimate the predic-
tion accuracy of the model, we compute the relative error
between the predicted application resilience and the applica-
tion resilience that we observe by performing FI. The predic-
tion accuracy Paccuracy is defined as follows:
Paccuracy = 1 − |Prate −Orate |
Orate
, (2)
where Prate is the predicted rate (of either the success, SDC
or interruption), andOrate is the observed rate by performing
FI. A perfect model has a Paccuracy of 1.0.
Training and Testing Phases. The modeling process of
machine learning includes training and testing. We use a set
of representative applications to train the model—once it is
trained, themodel is used to predict, or test, themanifestation
rates on new applications. We call the applications used
for training and testing the training dataset and the testing
dataset, respectively.
3 Overview
We give a high-level overview of PARIS. Figure 1 depicts
the workflow of the training process in PARIS. The most
challenging part of the training process is to construct fea-
tures relevant to application resilience and producing high
modeling accuracy.
Features Construction. We use instruction type and
number of instruction instances for each type as features.
A static instruction in a program has an instruction type
(opcode), and can be executed many times, each of which
is an instruction instance. Using the number of instruction
instances for each instruction type as a feature will result in
too many features, which demands a large training dataset.
To reduce the number of features, we group all instruction
types (65 in total) into four groups: control flow instructions,
floating point instructions, integer instructions, andmemory-
related instructions. For each instruction group, we count
the number of instruction instances as a feature.
Furthermore, we use six resilience computation patterns
proposed in [26] as features. Among the six patterns, four of
them (conditional statement, shifting, data truncation, and
data overwriting) are individual instructions that cannot
be grouped into the four instruction groups. Two of them
(dead locations and repeated addition) include multiple in-
structions and those instructions together (not individual
instructions) contribute to application resilience.
Counting dead locations and repeated addition from the
dynamic instruction trace is challenging because we must re-
peatedly search within the trace to find correlation between
instructions. To detect dead locations, we use a technique
that caches intermediate results of trace analysis to avoid re-
peated trace scanning. To detect repeated addition, we build a
data dependency graph for addition instructions. Such graph
enables easy detection of repeated addition.
Because different instruction instances can have differ-
ent capabilities to tolerate errors, even though they have
the same instruction type (or the same resilience computa-
tion pattern), we introduce resilience weight when counting
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instruction instances. The resilience weight gives each in-
struction instance a weight quantifying the possible number
of single-bit errors that can be tolerated by the instance.
Furthermore, we introduce execution order information
as a feature. We notice that instruction order can affect the
application resilience. However, representing the order infor-
mation of all instruction instances as a feature is a challenge.
We use N-gram [9, 12], a technique commonly used for pro-
cessing speech data, to capture the order information.
Machine Learning Techniques. There are many ma-
chine learning models we can use for PARIS. We use a
model selection method [33] to find the machine learning
model with the highest prediction accuracy. We also use the
filtering-based feature selection [19] to filter out irrelevant
and redundant features. As used in the existing machine
learning work, we use model tuning techniques including
whitening, bagging, and hyperparameter tuning to improve
the prediction accuracy of our model.
Use of PARIS. To use PARIS, users do not need doing FI.
Instead, users generate a dynamic instruction trace and feeds
it to PARIS. PARIS will output a numerical value, which is
the predicted success, SDC, or interruption rate.
4 Design
We describe the design details in this section.
4.1 Feature Construction
To construct features for the regression models, we have the
following requirements: (1) The features should be relevant
to application resilience. (2) The number of features should
be small enough. Ideally, the number should be much smaller
than the number of applications for training to avoid under-
determination of the model. (3) We should avoid redundant
and irrelevant features. Those features can lower prediction
accuracy. We describe our feature construction following the
above requirements in this section.
4.1.1 Instruction Groups
The first features we introduce into the models are the in-
struction type and number of instruction instances in each
type. These features are highly relevant to application re-
silience. For example, recent studies [23, 40, 44] reveal that
floating point instructionsmake application resilient to faults,
because the faults in mantissa bits of floating point numbers
are often ignorable by the application (especially HPC appli-
cations). Load/store instructions also has significant impact
on application resilience, because the computation following
load/store instructions may need those loaded/stored values.
We use the LLVM compiler [36] to build applications,
which is architecture independent, allowing us to build a
more general and reusable model for resilience prediction.
Table 1. Four groups of instruction types and three resilience
patterns as features to build the machine learning models.
Group Name Instruction types
Control Flow Instructions
(CFI)
Br, Indirectbr, Select, PHI, Fence, DMAFence, Call
Floating Point Instructions
(FPI)
Fadd, Fsub, Fmul, Fdiv, Frem, Cosine, Sine
Integer Instructions (II) add, sub, mul, Udiv, Sdiv, Urem, Srem
Memory-related Instruc-
tions (MI)
Load, Store, DMAStore, DMALoad, Getelementptr, ExtractEle-
ment, InsertElement, ExtractValue, InsertValue, FPToUI, FPToSI,
UIToFP, SIToFP, PtrToInt, IntToPtr, AddrSpaceCast
Pattern name Instruction types
Condition ICmp, FCmp, Switch, And, Or, Xor
Shift Shl, LShl, AShl
Truncation Trunc, ZExt, Sext, FPTrunc, BitCast, FPExt
We enumerate all LLVM IR instructions and get 65 instruc-
tion types. However, building a feature vector with 65 in-
struction types will lead to at least 65 unknown variables in
the solution space. To fill up the solution space, it could easily
require thousands of applications [14, 22] to train the models.
This violates the requirement (2) and can be time-consuming
to find the optimal solution.
To address this problem, we group 65 instruction types
into four groups based on the functionality of instructions
to reduce the number of features. Instruction functionality
relies on instruction types; different instruction types have
different impacts on application resilience. For example, we
group control flow related instructions (e.g., Br and Select)
into a group, and group floating point instructions (e.g., Fadd
and Sine) into a group. Table 1 lists the four groups, in-
cluding control flow instructions, floating point instructions,
integer instructions, and memory-related instructions.
For each instruction group, we count the number of in-
struction instances from the dynamic instruction trace, and
then normalize the number based on the total number of
instruction instances. We normalize the number as a feature
to make the feature value independent of the size of the
dynamic instruction trace.
4.1.2 Using Resilience Computation Patterns as
Features
The recent work [26] finds six resilience computation pat-
terns strongly related to application resilience. The resilience
computation pattern is defined as combinations or sequences
of computations that make an application naturally resilient.
These six patterns are dead locations, repeated addition, con-
ditional statements, shifting, data truncation, and data over-
writing. We introduce the patterns of dead locations and
repeated addition as features, because the two patterns in-
clude multiple instructions and those instructions together
(not individual instructions) contribute to application re-
silience; The other four patterns are individual instructions
and could fall into the four instruction groups. However, we
use them separately as features, because of their significance
to application resilience [26].
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We describe how to introduce the six patterns as features
as follows. A pattern can be repeatedly executed by the ap-
plication. We name the execution of a specific pattern within
the application as the pattern instance. To introduce these
six patterns as features, we could simply count the number
of the pattern instances for each pattern. However, doing so
has a couple of challenges.
First, counting the number of the pattern instances for
dead locations and repeated addition can be time-consuming,
because we have to find correlations between instructions to
determine if the location is dead or if the addition repeatedly
happens to the same variable. Doing so requires iteratively
scan the dynamic instruction trace. We discuss how to ef-
ficiently count the number of the pattern instances for the
two patterns in Section 4.1.3 and Section 4.1.4, respectively.
Second, for the patterns of conditional statements, shifting,
data truncation and data overwriting that are represented as
individual instructions (see the last three rows in Table 1 for
these instructions), simply counting the number of pattern
instances cannot discriminate the fault tolerance capabilities
of different pattern instances. For example, the fault toler-
ance capability of the “shifting” pattern (a pattern involving
a shift instruction) depends on how many bits are shifted. A
shift instruction instance shifting three bits can tolerate three
single-bit errors, while a shift instruction instance shifting
one bit can tolerate one single-bit error. To distinguish the
fault tolerance capabilities of different instruction instances,
we introduce weights (named resilience weight) for counting
instances of the patterns. Besides introducing weights for
the patterns of conditional statements, shifting, data trun-
cation and data overwriting, we also introduce weights to
instructions whose instances can also have different fault tol-
erance capabilities. We describe how we determine weights
for instruction instances in Section 4.1.5.
4.1.3 Extracting the Feature of Dead Location
Dead locations refer to those locations that have short live
time. While the errors in those locations can propagate to
one (or a few) other locations, many of the dead locations are
not used anymore. As a result, the total number of corrupted
locations in the program can decrease, because of those short
live locations. A code region with a higher percentage of
dead locations (i.e., the number of dead locations over the
number of total locations) has higher resilience.
To efficiently detect dead locations and calculate the per-
centage of dead locations, we split the dynamic instruction
trace into chunks and pre-process the chunks before de-
tecting dead locations. During the trace pre-processing, we
analyze instructions in each chunk and record names of lo-
cations within the chunk. This location record is saved in an
array for each chunk. To determine if a location in a chunk
is a dead location, we only need to check whether the same
location is used in any following chunks by examining the
arrays. If the location is not used, then the location is a dead
a
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for(i=0;i<N;i++){
…
e = a + 4;
…
y = d + e;
…
c = z + y;
…
a = b + c;
…
}
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
#0
#1 #2
#3#4
#5#6
#7#8
Figure 2. An example to detect repeated additions.
location. In essence, the arrays for chunks save instruction
analysis results to avoid repeatedly scanning the trace and
analyzing instructions. For each chunk, we normalize the
number of dead locations by the total number of locations
within the chunk and compute the percentage of dead loca-
tions for the chunk. We use the average dead location rate
of all chunks as a feature.
4.1.4 Extracting the Feature of Repeated Addition
Repeated addition refers to the addition repeatedly happen-
ing to a variable, such that the error in the variable can be
amortized. To decide if an addition instruction is a part of
repeated addition, we must first decide if the addition in-
struction is involved in a self addition. The self addition is
that a location adds other location(s) to itself. The pseudo
code in Figure 2 gives an example of self addition.
To detect a self addition, we first construct a data depen-
dency graph for addition operations. A node in the graph
is a location; edges between graph nodes represent data de-
pendency. Then, given an addition instruction, we examine
the output operand of the addition instruction, and decide
if the location (the output operand) is a source operand of
a previous addition operation by backward traversing the
graph.
Figure 2 illustrates how a data dependency graph looks
like and how a self addition is found. In the example, we
have four addition statements (operations) in a for loop. The
location a appears as the output of the last addition statement
(a = b +c in Line 9). To determine if the addition statement is
involved in a self addition, we find the node 0 corresponding
to a in the data dependency graph. We traverse the graph
backward, and find a appears in a previous node, the node 7.
The node 7 corresponds to a source operand of a previous
addition statement (e = a + 4). Hence, a self addition is
detected. A repeated addition is composed by a number of
self additions.
To use repeated addition as a feature, we normalize the
number of repeated addition instances by total number of
instruction instances. This makes the feature value indepen-
dent of the size of the dynamic instruction trace.
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…
load  reg1, 0x3ffffffd
…
add  reg0, 0x4,  reg1
…
…
add  reg0, 0x4, reg1
…
load  reg1,  0x3ffffffd
…
0x3ffffffd
Corrupted locations:
0x3ffffffd, reg1, reg0
Corrupted locations:
0x3ffffffd, reg1
Figure 3. An example to show that the execution order of
instructions matters to error propagation.
4.1.5 Resilience Weight
Given an instruction, all bit locations of its input and out-
put operands are subject to error corruption. The resilience
weight (Res) of an instruction is defined as follows.
Res = #bit locations that tolerate errors#o f all bit locations (3)
Using the right-shift instruction as an example. The in-
struction has three 8-bit operands and in total 24 locations.
Assume that an instance of the instruction shifts four least
significant bits of an operand. The shifted four bits can tol-
erate four single-bit errors. Also, the eight bits in the output
operand of the instruction can tolerate errors because of
the result overwriting in the output operand. Hence, in this
example, the resilience weight for this instruction instance
is (4+8)/24 = 0.5.
For any floating point and integer instruction, the bit lo-
cations that can tolerate errors are the bit locations of the
output operands, because we expect errors in the output
operands can be overwritten by the instructions.
When counting the number of instruction instances or the
number of pattern instances, we use the weights to account
the numbers.
Putting All Together. As a result of the above feature con-
struction, we construct a feature vector of ten features, for-
mulated in Equation 4. The notation of the equation can be
found in Table 1.
(4)F
ave
10 = [CFI , FPI , I I ,MI ,
Condition, Shi f t ,Truncation,DO,DLR,RA]
We call F ave10 the foundation feature vector and call the ten
features foundation features in the rest of the paper.
4.2 Including Instruction Order
The foundation features are not good enough to achieve high
prediction accuracy. In particular, the foundation features
lack instruction order (i.e., the execution order) information.
Capturing the instruction order is important, because it mat-
ters to error propagation.
To give an intuition of why the execution order matters,
we use a simple example shown in Figure 3. In this example,
we have a load instruction and an addition instruction. As-
sume that an error happens on a memory address 0x3ffffffd.
If the load instruction happens first, then the erroneous value
in the memory address can propagate to the locations reд1
and reд0. but if the addition instruction happens first, then
the erroneous value in the memory address can only propa-
gate to the location reд1. This example is a demonstration
of how the execution order matters to error propagation.
To introduce execution order information into the feature
vector, we use the “N-gram” technique. The N-gram is a
technique used in computational linguistics. It can work on
a sequence of streaming words, and predict next word using
sequences of previous words. N-gram can capture the word
order information. In particular, every n continuous words
composes a n−gram (n = 1, 2, 3, ...). We can introduce the
order information into features by using the N-gram.
In particular, we partition the dynamic instruction trace
into chunks (each chunk is a gram). Each chunk is treated as
a “word”, and the sequence of chunks is processed as the se-
quence of words. For each chunk, we collect ten foundation
features, and build a foundation feature vector of size ten
for each chunk. Then, we build an average foundation fea-
ture vector (denoted as F ave10 ) whose feature values are the
average values of foundation feature vectors of all chunks.
Furthermore, we combine every two chunks to build a 2-
gram (or bigram in the language of N-gram). For each bigram,
we combine two foundation feature vectors to build a 2-gram
feature vector of size 20. After that, we build an average 2-
gram feature vector (denoted as F ave20 ) for all bigrams. F ave20
is the average value of all 2-grams feature vectors; F ave20 has
a size of 20.
After that, we have F ave10 of size 10 and F ave20 of size 20.
The new feature vector with the execution order information
is a combination of F ave10 and F ave20 . The new feature vector
has a size of 30. We denote the new feature vector F ave30
Figure 4 depicts how we build the feature vector with the
execution order information included.
We do not consider trigram (i.e., 3-gram) or higher gram,
because common practices [15, 49] demonstrate that there
is no need to use higher grams than bigram. In [15], bi-
gram achieves better accuracy than trigram. Using trigram
or higher grams does not provide much improvement in
prediction accuracy, but dramatically increases the feature
vector size and increases the complexity of model training.
4.3 Models Selection
There are tens of regression models. Each of them has pros
and cons, and can be fit to different scenarios. We explore 18
most common regression models.
We use cross-validation to evaluate 18 regression models
on the training dataset to select the best models. CV parti-
tions the dataset intop folds. q ofp folds are used for training,
while the remaining p−q folds are used for testing. There are
p/(p − q) rounds of training/testing. In each round, different
6
…average
…
average
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…
Output: the feature vector after using N-gram
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Input: Six Chunks
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Figure 4. Applying the N-gram technique to introduce the
execution order information.
p−q folds are used for testing.We choose the regressionmod-
els that have the highest prediction accuracy (on average)
among all testing dataset.
In our study, we choose top five regression models based
on CV. The five models are shown in Table 2. Among the
remaining 13 models, 12 of them have very poor prediction
accuracy (the prediction accuracy is even negative, based on
the calculation of Equation 2); one of them (i.e., the decision
tree) is just a special case of one of the top five (the random
forest) in nature. For the five selected models, we improve
their model accuracy as follows.
4.4 Feature Selection
After the five models are selected, we explore the possibility
to reduce the feature vector size for each of those models.
Reducing the feature vector size is useful to eliminate those
irrelevant and redundant features to improve modeling ac-
curacy.
We use three common techniques to select features: vari-
ance, p-value, and mutual information. Simply speaking, the
variance of a feature measures the variance of feature values
across different input code; The p-value is metric that that
measures the significance level between a feature and the
modeling result (i.e., the success, SDC, or interruption rate);
The mutual information measures the mutual dependency
between a feature and the modeling result.
Using the above method, we sort features into a list. In
total, we have three lists, each of which corresponds to one
of the three techniques. We design a voting strategy based on
the combination of the three lists. In particular, each feature
in a list has an index. For each feature, we add its three
indexes to get a global index. We sort the features again
based on the global index. We choose the best k (where k =
2, 3, ..., 30) features according to their prediction accuracy.
Such voting strategy and feature selection algorithm [42, 56,
61] are common in machine learning.
4.5 Model Tuning
After the feature selection process, we further tune the five
models. We choose the one with the highest prediction accu-
racy as the final model. We use the following tuning tech-
niques for model tuning.
Whitening:Whitening [17] is commonly used for avoid-
ing domination effects of any features for better generaliza-
tion to improve the modeling accuracy.
Bagging (Model Averaging): Bagging [21] is often used
for reducing the variance in the training data, so that we can
eliminate the effect of bad outliers.
5 Implementation
Dataset Construction.We have multiple requirements on
creating training and testing dataset. (1) The training dataset
must be large to avoid model underdetermination (i.e., the
evidence available is insufficient to identify which belief
one should hold about that evidence.); (2) applications used
to generate training and testing dataset must have diverse
computation and have diverse resilience characteristics. (3)
Applications used to generate training dataset must have
explicit result verification phases. Having those phases al-
lows us to easily determine the fault manifestation (SDC,
interruption, and success).
We use representative benchmark suites and scientific
applications to create the testing dataset, including NAS
parallel benchmark suite [4], PARSEC benchmark suite [8],
CORAL benchmark suite [1], Rodinia benchmark suite [13],
SPEC CPU2000 [29], and two scientific applications (Her-
cules for earthquake simulation [2] and PuReMD for reactive
molecular dynamics simulation [54]). We carefully choose 25
applications from the above benchmark suites and scientific
applications for testing. The 25 applications are shown in
Table 4. We call the 25 applications big benchmarks in the
rest of the paper.
To train PARIS, we use 100 common computation kernels
from HackerRank [27]. These kernels are relatively shorter
than the big benchmarks, but these kernels all have explicit
verification phases.
Trace Generation.We use LLVM-Tracer [52], a tool to
generate dynamic LLVM IR traces based on LLVM instru-
mentation. The trace includes LLVM IR instructions and
their operands.
To introduce the execution order information, we define
“chunk"; each chunk is the dynamic instruction trace of a
loop or code between two neighbor loops. We extend LLVM-
tracer to generate a subtrace for each chunk.
Regression Model Selection.We use 10-fold cross val-
idation to evaluate 18 regression models on the training
dataset to select the best models. These 18models are Kneigh-
bors Regression, Gradient Boosting Regression, Random For-
est Regression, SV Regression, NuSVR Regression, Decision
Tree Regression,SGD Regression, Lasso Regression, Elastic
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Net Regression, Huber Regression, Bayesian Ridge Regres-
sion, Passive-Aggressive Regression, Ridge Regression, Ker-
nelRidge Regression, TheilSen Regression, RANSAC Regres-
sion, Least Square Linear Regression, and MLP Regression.
We use scikit-learn [48] to implement the models. Table 2
shows the top five regression models with the highest pre-
diction accuracy. The remaining 13 regression models are
not listed because of their low prediction accuracy.
Tuning Hyperparameters. Each regression model has
multiple hyperparameters. We leverage “grid-search” [7] to
decide the values of hyperparameters for training.
6 Evaluation
We use the trained regression models to predict the rate of
success and interruption. The SDC rate is simply the result
of subtracting the rates of success and interruption from one
(“1”). We do not use the models to directly predict the SDC
rate, because the observed SDC rate (Orate in Equation 2) for
some applications can be very small (close to 0), which easily
makes |Prate −Orate |/Orate in Equation 2 larger than 1. As
a result, Paccuracy is negative, which is counter-intuitive (it
should be always non-negative).
We evaluate our models and modeling methods from two
perspectives: (1) the modeling accuracy; (2) the contributions
of various modeling techniques and model optimization tech-
niques to the modeling accuracy.
6.1 Prediction Accuracy
We show the prediction accuracy in Table 2 for the top five
regression models. We have applied feature selection and
model tuning techniques to improve the prediction accuracy
of these models. The second and fourth columns of Table 2
show the results from cross-validation. We use the 100 small
computation kernels for training. The third and fifth columns
of Table 2 show the results from testing. We use the big
benchmarks for testing.
Table 2 shows that among the five regression models, the
Gradient Boosting Regression achieves the best prediction
accuracy for both small computation kernels and big bench-
marks. The prediction accuracy for them is 82% and 77%,
respectively. The variance of prediction accuracy for the
Gradient Boosting Regression is smaller than most of other
regression models. Hence, the Gradient Boosting Regres-
sion is the best. For the following experiments, if indicated
otherwise, we only show the results of using the Gradient
Boosting Regression.
We present more details of the prediction result in Table 4.
The table shows that the prediction accuracy for predicting
the success rate is 82% (on average) with a variation of 0.02;
The prediction accuracy for predicting the interruption rate
is 77% with a variation of 0.05.
Comparison with the State-of-the-Art. We compare
our prediction accuracy with that of Trident [40], a very
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Figure 5. The speedup of using PARIS over random FI to
predict the rate of manifestations.
recent work that uses analytical models to estimate the SDC
rate. We use the 11 benchmarks evaluated in Trident. We
use the same input for the 11 benchmarks as Trident uses.
Table 4 shows the prediction accuracy of Trident in the last
12 rows.
Table 4 shows that the average prediction accuracy of
PARIS for the 11 benchmarks is 38.6%. However, the average
prediction accuracy of Trident is -272.5%. PARIS achieves
much better prediction accuracy than Trident.
The reason why Trident has relatively low prediction
accuracy is as follows. Trident uses analytical models to
reason the possibility of SDC. To avoid the complexity of
reasoning, they do not analyze all instructions, which results
in low prediction accuracy.
6.2 Efficiency Study–Comparing with Random
Fault Injection
We compare the time of using FI and using PARIS to pre-
dict the rate of manifestations for the 25 big benchmarks.
The number of FIs is determined by using a statistical ap-
proach [37] with the confidence level of 99% and the margin
of error 1%. In particular, we use 3000 FIs for each bench-
mark. Whenmeasuring the time of using PARIS, we measure
the time spent on the whole workflow, including dynamic
instruction trace generation, feature extraction, and making
prediction with the trained machine learning model.
Figure 5 shows the results. In general, the speedup of using
PARIS over random FI is up to 450x (see LULESH). Among
the 25 benchmarks, PARIS is faster than random FI for 20
benchmarks. For one benchmark (LU), PARIS uses almost
the same time as FI. For the four benchmarks (CG, BT, SP,
and bfs), PARIS is slower, because of the time-consuming
trace generation. We hope to improve the performance of the
trace generation by using trace compression in the future.
6.3 Feature Selection and Analysis
We use the feature selection technique (i.e., the voting strat-
egy) discussed in Section 4.4 to select features. We analyze
the feature selection result in this section.
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Table 2. The average prediction accuracy for the three rates (i.e., Success rate=SR, SDC rate=SDCR, and interruption rate=IR).
Numbers in the parenthesis are for the variance of the prediction accuracy. Notation: APA=average prediction accuracy,
SCK=small computation kernels, HPCB=HPC benchmarks.
Regression models APA for SR on SCK APA for SR on HPCB APA for IR on SCK APA for IR onHPCB
SV Regression 0.75 (0.15) 0.72 (0.17) 0.71 (0.17) 0.67 (0.24)
Gradient Boosting Regression 0.81 (0.13) 0.82 (0.02) 0.75 (0.15) 0.77 (0.05)
Random Forest Regression 0.77 (0.14) 0.74 (0.02) 0.72 (0.14) 0.71 (0.18)
Kneighbors Regression 0.74 (0.16) 0.7 (0.04) 0.63 (0.21) 0.56 (0.32)
NuSVR Regression 0.75 (0.21) 0.74 (0.08) 0.74 (0.17) 0.66 (0.26)
Table 3. Feature voting scores for each dimension of the
feature vector F ave30 .
(a) Feature voting scores for predicting the success rate.
Dimension Number 4 24 8 28 17 12 14 22 18 27
Sorted voting score (Smaller is better) 20 22 23 24 25 27 29 29 31 32
Dimension Number 2 3 23 7 20 16 6 21 13 26
Sorted voting score (Smaller is better) 33 39 39 40 43 45 46 48 50 50
Dimension Number 11 1 30 15 5 10 25 29 9 19
Sorted voting score (Smaller is better) 53 54 62 69 70 71 74 74 86 87
(b) Feature voting scores for predicting the interruption rate.
Dimension Number 14 18 4 8 27 24 28 7 30 16
Sorted voting score (Smaller is better) 20 23 24 27 27 32 32 34 37 38
Dimension Number 6 17 10 26 12 13 1 3 11 2
Sorted voting score (Smaller is better) 39 40 42 43 46 46 47 47 52 53
Dimension Number 21 19 20 23 5 15 22 25 9 29
Sorted voting score (Smaller is better) 53 55 55 56 62 63 69 69 77 87
Table 3 shows the global indexes for all features. Table 3.a
reveals that the 4th dimension (the memory-related instruc-
tions), 24th dimension (the memory-related instructions in
bigram), and 8th dimension (the pattern of overwriting) in
F ave30 rank the highest; Table 3.b reveals that the 14th di-
mension (the memory-related instructions in bigram), 18th
dimension (the pattern of overwriting in bigram), and 4th
dimension (the memory-related instructions) in F ave30 rank
the highest. Those dimensions are the memory-related in-
structions, which seem to matter most to the application
resilience.
In addition, both tables reveal that the 9th dimension (i.e.,
the pattern of dead location), 19th dimension (i.e., the pat-
tern of dead location in bigram), and 29th dimension (i.e.,
the pattern of dead location in bigram) rank relatively low.
This result indicates that the feature of dead location seems
to contribute less to application resilience than the other
features.
6.4 Evaluation of Model Tuning and Feature
Construction Optimization
We study the impact of our model tuning (whitening, bag-
ging and tuning hyperparameters) and feature construction
techniques (bigram and resilience weight) on the model ac-
curacy. We use the Gradient Boosting Regression model and
100 small computation kernels (for training) for our study.
We start with the model without any of the five techniques,
and then apply them one by one.
Figure 6 shows the results. We can see that the prediction
accuracy keeps increasing after we apply those techniques
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Figure 6. Evaluating the impact of model tuning and fea-
ture construction optimization on the prediction accuracy
for the three rates. Notation: FCO = “feature construction
optimization”.
one by one. This demonstrates the effectiveness of our tech-
niques. Among the five techniques, the most effective ones
are resilience weight, hyperparameters tuning, and bagging
when predicting the success rate, and bigram and resilience
weight when predicting the interruption rate.
We notice that introducing bigram, the average predic-
tion accuracy is not increased when predicting the success
rate. However, examining individual computation kernels,
we find that the prediction accuracy for 71% of kernels be-
comes better, with up to 26% improvement in the prediction
accuracy. There are two outliers that largely decrease pre-
diction accuracy after applying bigram. Furthermore, when
predicting the interruption rate, the average prediction ac-
curacy increases 3% after applying bigram into features. 3%
is a large improvement in the machine learning field. Hence,
we conclude that using bigram is very helpful to improve
the modeling accuracy.
7 Related Work
Using Machine Learning to Address Resilience Prob-
lems. There are a couple of recent efforts that use machine
learning [3, 18, 35, 45, 46, 58] to address resilience problems.
Mitra et al. [45] build a regression model to predict anom-
aly output of an application, given a certain combination
of input parameters to the application. Laguna et al. [35]
train a machine learning classifier IPAS. IPAS learns which
instructions can have a high likelihood of leading to a silent
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Table 4. The detailed prediction results for 25 big benchmarks. Notation: SR=Success Rate; SDCR=SDC Rate; IR=Interruption
Rate; Pred.=Prediction; Obs.=Observed; Accy=Accuracy.
Big bench-
marks
Suite Program in-
put
Obs. SR Pred. SR Pred. Accy
for SR
(higher is
better)
Obs. SDCR Pred. SDCR Pred. Accy
for SDCR
(higher is
better)
Pred. Accy
for SDCR
by Trident
Obs. IR Pred. IR Pred. Accy
for IR
(higher is
better)
IS NAS Class S 0.653 0.701 0.926 0.083 0.103 0.020 N/A 0.264 0.195 0.739
LU NAS Class S 0.575 0.698 0.787 0.174 0.150 0.863 N/A 0.251 0.152 0.606
Nn Rodinia filelist_4 5
30 90
0.513 0.847 0.348 0.173 0.000 0.000 N/A 0.314 0.323 0.973
Myocyte Rodinia 100 1 0 4 0.741 0.707 0.954 0.022 0.023 0.939 N/A 0.237 0.270 0.862
Backprop Rodinia 35536 0.670 0.528 0.788 0.016 0.111 -4.946 N/A 0.314 0.361 0.850
CG NAS Class S 0.739 0.704 0.953 0.139 0.147 0.941 N/A 0.122 0.149 0.782
MG NAS Class S 0.781 0.640 0.820 0.008 0.009 0.835 N/A 0.211 0.351 0.339
BT NAS Class S 0.656 0.606 0.924 0.164 0.252 0.465 N/A 0.180 0.142 0.791
SP NAS Class S 0.385 0.375 0.974 0.306 0.255 0.832 N/A 0.309 0.371 0.801
DC NAS Class S 0.578 0.690 0.806 0.060 0.000 0.000 N/A 0.362 0.396 0.906
Lud Rodinia 512.dat 0.760 0.669 0.881 0.142 0.135 0.953 N/A 0.098 0.195 0.007
Kmeans Rodinia 100 0.843 0.712 0.844 0.045 0.093 -0.070 N/A 0.112 0.195 0.256
sAMG CORAL aniso 0.467 0.704 0.492 0.370 0.144 0.388 N/A 0.163 0.152 0.933
STREAM PARSEC 10 20 64
512 512
100 none
oput.txt 4
0.723 0.611 0.845 0.066 0.194 -0.938 N/A 0.211 0.195 0.926
Libquantum SPEC 33 5 0.863 0.922 0.931 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.924 0.103 0.125 0.784
Blackscholes PARSEC in_4.txt 0.663 0.571 0.862 0.122 0.203 0.338 0.878 0.215 0.226 0.949
Sad Parboil reference.bin
frame.bin
0.475 0.498 0.951 0.216 0.314 0.546 0.650 0.309 0.188 0.607
Bfs-parboil Parboil graph_input.dat0.496 0.686 0.617 0.131 0.010 0.079 0.967 0.373 0.304 0.815
Hercules CMU scan sim-
ple_case.e
0.580 0.610 0.949 0.182 0.172 0.945 -0.282 0.238 0.218 0.917
PuReMD Purdue
Univ.
geo ffield
control
0.350 0.492 0.594 0.090 0.021 0.232 0.610 0.560 0.487 0.870
Lulesh CORAL -s 1 -p 0.634 0.444 0.701 0.120 0.258 -0.148 -36.400 0.246 0.298 0.788
Hotspot Rodinia 64 64 1 1
temp_64
power_64
0.714 0.699 0.979 0.121 0.116 0.956 0.790 0.165 0.185 0.877
Bfs-rodinia Rodinia graph4096.txt 0.655 0.700 0.932 0.124 0.048 0.389 0.792 0.221 0.252 0.859
Nw Rodinia 2048 10 1 0.664 0.619 0.933 0.140 0.185 0.677 0.410 0.196 0.195 0.996
Pathfinder Rodinia 1000 10 0.623 0.797 0.721 0.231 0.055 0.236 0.687 0.146 0.149 0.983
Average(var) N/A N/A 0.632 0.649 0.820(0.02) 0.131 0.120 0.211 -2.725 0.237 0.243 0.769(0.05)
output corruption. IPAS duplicates those instructions to mit-
igate the effect of silent output corruption. Vishnu et al. [58]
use attributes including system and application states to pre-
dict whether a multi-bit error will lead to corrupted output.
Desh [18] predict node failures by training a recurrent neural
network model using system logs. Nie et al. [46] use system
characteristics such as temperature, power consumption, ap-
plication states as features to predict the occurrence of GPU
errors. PARIS is the first work applying machine learning to
predict the rate of manifestations.
Random FI. This is the most common method is to study
application resilience [10, 16, 20, 24, 31, 32, 34, 38, 41, 43, 47].
Typically application-level FI has to be performed many
times to ensure statistical significance. Some research prunes
unnecessary FI to reduce FI efforts. Hari et al. [28] explore
instruction equivalence for selective FI. They further reduce
FI positions by leveraging the equivalence of intermediate
states in execution and instruction-level approximate com-
puting [51, 57]. Our work tries to address the inefficiency
of FI to study application resilience. But the above existing
work is complementary to our work.
Error PropagationAnalysis.Application level error prop-
agation has been widely studied. Li et al. [39] implement a
FI tool to study error propagation in GPU applications, and
Trident [40], a three-level error propagation model to pre-
dict SDC probabilities of programs. Calhoun et al. [11] study
how corruption state changes due to error propagation at
the instruction and application variable level for three ap-
plications. Ashraf et al. [3] propose an error propagation
model to study error propagation for MPI applications. Our
work does not focus on error propagation, but includes an
N-gram based technique to embed the execution order in-
formation into the feature vector to consider the effects of
error propagation.
8 Conclusions
As supercomputers increase in size and complexity, the rate
of transient faults is expected to increase and becomes a
severe problem threatening computation correctness. Tech-
niques to understand the manifestation of transient faults
become increasingly important to ensure result correctness
for those applications running on supercomputers. This pa-
per introduces PARIS, a machine learning based approach
to predict the rate of manifestations of transient faults. We
train PARIS on 100 small computation kernels and test on 25
big benchmarks using features highly related to application
resilience. We test 18 regression models and find the Gradi-
ent Boosting Regression the best machine learning model
for predicting the rate of manifestations of transient faults
in terms of prediction accuracy.
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